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Abstract	  
Biodiversity	  loss	  is	  a	  globally	  significant	  problem.	  Institutional	  failure	  to	  halt	  this	  loss	  suggests	  
current	  arrangements	  are	  not	  fit	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  conserving	  biodiversity.	  The	  objective	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  
to	  diagnose	  institutional	  fitness	  for	  conserving	  biodiversity	  in	  the	  Tasmanian	  Midlands	  of	  Australia,	  a	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highly	  modified	  agricultural	  landscape	  with	  critically	  endangered	  biodiversity	  values.	  This	  paper	  presents	  
and	  applies	  a	  novel	  diagnostic	  framework	  that	  adopts	  a	  broad	  view	  of	  institutional	  fit,	  drawing	  on	  
concepts	  from	  adaptive	  governance,	  institutional	  theory,	  and	  public	  administration,	  and	  finds	  four	  areas	  
of	  poor	  fit	  that	  can	  guide	  reform	  efforts.	  The	  first	  is	  a	  narrow	  framing	  of	  biodiversity	  objectives,	  leading	  
to	  neglect	  of	  key	  social	  and	  ecological	  concerns.	  Second,	  the	  interplay	  of	  current	  arrangements	  fails	  to	  
buffer	  key	  economic	  and	  political	  drivers,	  and	  compromises	  adaptive	  capacity.	  Third,	  limited	  
government	  authority	  and	  embedded	  power	  relations	  raise	  questions	  about	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  
fairness	  of	  current	  approaches.	  Finally,	  the	  reluctance	  of	  governments	  to	  devolve	  authority	  and	  
decision-­‐making	  powers	  to	  self-­‐organizing	  networks	  constrains	  adaptation.	  This	  suite	  of	  fit	  problems	  
constrains	  achievement	  of	  biodiversity	  conservation,	  particularly	  in	  dealing	  with	  landscape	  
multifunctionality,	  the	  need	  to	  balance	  private	  landholder	  rights	  and	  responsibilities,	  and	  the	  need	  to	  
consider	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  emerging	  novel	  and	  hybrid	  ecosystems.	  	  
	  
1.0	  Introduction	  
Many	  individuals	  and	  organizations	  have	  been	  working	  for	  decades	  to	  conserve	  biodiversity	  and	  
address	  the	  causes	  of	  its	  decline.	  Despite	  global	  targets	  to	  halt	  biodiversity	  loss,	  even	  modest	  
commitments	  have	  not	  been	  met;	  and	  rates	  of	  loss	  show	  no	  signs	  of	  slowing	  (Butchart	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  
Institutions,	  and	  the	  governance	  systems	  of	  which	  they	  are	  a	  part,	  are	  critical	  to	  addressing	  biodiversity	  
decline	  because	  they	  mediate	  between	  human	  and	  environmental	  systems	  and	  can	  influence	  the	  
trajectory	  of	  these	  systems	  (Chaffin,	  Gosnell,	  &	  Cosens,	  2014).	  Institutions	  are	  the	  regulative,	  normative,	  
and	  cultural-­‐cognitive	  elements	  that	  structure,	  stabilize,	  and	  provide	  meaning	  to	  social	  life,	  and	  shape	  
the	  structure	  and	  identities	  of	  organizations	  and	  individuals	  (Scott,	  2014).	  Though	  critical	  to	  success,	  the	  
failure	  of	  current	  institutional	  arrangements	  suggests	  significant	  change	  is	  imperative	  if	  future	  targets	  
are	  to	  be	  met	  (Hill,	  Halamish,	  Gordon,	  &	  Clark,	  2013).	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Effective	  biodiversity	  institutions	  must	  be	  fit-­‐for-­‐purpose.	  The	  concept	  of	  institutional	  fit	  has	  
achieved	  currency	  in	  the	  environmental	  governance	  literature,	  with	  many	  authors	  discussing	  the	  need	  
for	  institutional	  arrangements	  to	  match	  the	  spatial,	  temporal,	  and	  functional	  aspects	  of	  the	  ecosystems	  
governed	  (e.g.	  Folke,	  Pritchard,	  Berkes,	  Colding,	  &	  Swedin,	  2007).	  Biodiversity	  conservation	  requires	  
attention	  to	  multiple	  spatial	  scales,	  and	  policies	  focusing	  on	  landscape-­‐scale	  approaches	  are	  needed	  to	  
accommodate	  the	  complexity	  of	  ecosystems	  and	  ecosystem	  processes	  (Gonthier	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  
Institutional	  approaches	  to	  conserving	  biodiversity	  are	  diverse,	  but	  can	  be	  grouped	  into	  three	  broad	  
categories:	  1)	  protecting	  assets,	  2)	  responding	  to	  threats,	  or	  3)	  supporting	  the	  conditions	  of	  ecosystem	  
processes	  (Curtis	  and	  Lefroy,	  2010).	  Driven	  by	  legislative	  frameworks,	  many	  conservation	  initiatives	  tend	  
to	  focus	  on	  the	  conservation	  of	  individual	  assets	  (e.g.	  endangered	  species)	  and	  threats	  to	  these	  assets	  
(e.g.	  invasive	  species).	  This	  means	  that	  in	  practice	  many	  countries,	  such	  as	  Australia,	  tend	  to	  focus	  time	  
and	  investment	  on	  the	  first	  two	  categories.	  While	  efficient,	  this	  can	  be	  a	  source	  of	  institutional	  misfit,	  as	  
it	  tends	  to	  neglect	  the	  broader	  social-­‐ecological	  context	  and	  underlying	  causes	  of	  biodiversity	  decline	  
(Clement	  et	  al,	  2016;	  Curtis	  and	  Lefroy,	  2010).	  
Institutions	  also	  need	  to	  fit	  the	  functional	  and	  temporal	  dimensions	  of	  ecosystems,	  requiring	  
adoption	  of	  long-­‐term	  strategies,	  responses	  to	  short-­‐term	  changes	  causing	  irreparable	  damage,	  and	  
buffering	  against	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  drivers	  of	  change	  (Steinberg,	  2009).	  Political	  and	  cognitive	  
dimensions	  also	  need	  to	  be	  considered,	  including	  how	  biodiversity	  institutions	  fit	  within	  dominant	  
perspectives	  on	  nature	  conservation	  and	  the	  broader	  governance	  context	  (Vatn	  and	  Vedeld,	  2012).  
The	  concept	  of	  fit-­‐for-­‐purpose	  institutions	  highlights	  a	  need	  for	  governance	  systems	  that	  are	  
equipped	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  dynamics	  of	  change	  and	  adaptation.	  The	  non-­‐linear	  dynamics	  of	  linked	  
human-­‐environment	  systems	  –	  with	  the	  added	  pressures	  of	  climate	  change	  –	  require	  biodiversity	  
institutions	  able	  to	  cope	  with	  complexity	  and	  uncertainty	  as	  futures	  are	  created	  (Folke,	  2006;	  Stein	  et	  
al.,	  2013).	  Adaptive	  governance	  offers	  a	  model	  for	  institutional	  design	  with	  improved	  fit,	  as	  it	  provides	  a	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framework	  for	  decision-­‐making	  that	  deliberately	  fosters	  capacity	  to	  cope	  with	  uncertainty	  and	  
complexity	  (Chaffin	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  It	  calls	  for	  collaboration	  across	  multi-­‐layered	  governance	  networks,	  
multiple	  centers	  of	  authority,	  and	  deliberative	  decision-­‐making	  (Lebel	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  Such	  features	  can	  
complement	  existing	  governance	  arrangements	  to	  inform	  and	  enable	  effective	  and	  realistically	  
achievable	  governance	  transitions,	  provided	  contextual	  conditions	  are	  taken	  into	  account	  (Rijke	  et	  al.,	  
2012).	  	  
The	  objective	  of	  the	  research	  reported	  in	  this	  paper	  was	  to	  diagnose	  the	  fitness	  for	  purpose	  of	  
biodiversity	  institutions	  in	  a	  highly	  modified	  agricultural	  landscape.	  Conserving	  biodiversity	  is	  a	  
challenging	  task	  irrespective	  of	  location	  but	  it	  is	  even	  more	  challenging	  and	  complex	  given	  the	  multiple	  
demands	  on	  agricultural	  landscapes.	  There	  is	  an	  expanding	  global	  interest	  in	  enhancing	  agricultural	  
productivity	  and	  maintaining	  rural	  livelihoods	  whilst	  ensuring	  biodiversity	  and	  ecosystem	  services	  are	  
conserved	  (Dobrovolski,	  Loyola,	  da	  Fonseca,	  Diniz-­‐Filho,	  &	  Araújo,	  2014;	  Sayer	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  Our	  case	  
study,	  the	  Tasmanian	  Midlands	  of	  Australia,	  exemplifies	  these	  challenges	  and	  provides	  an	  ideal	  testing	  
ground	  for	  exploring	  institutional	  fit.	  	  
This	  research	  applies	  an	  original	  framework	  for	  diagnosing	  institutions	  outlined	  in	  Section	  2.1	  to	  
the	  landscape	  described	  in	  Section	  2.2.	  The	  results	  in	  relation	  to	  framing,	  interplay,	  power	  and	  authority,	  
and	  self-­‐organizing	  (Section	  3)	  are	  followed	  by	  a	  discussion	  of	  what	  these	  results	  mean	  for	  institutional	  
fit	  and	  for	  resolving	  conflict	  in	  the	  Midlands	  (Section	  4).	  A	  key	  contribution	  of	  this	  research	  is	  that	  it	  
expands	  the	  notion	  of	  fit	  as	  used	  in	  the	  adaptive	  governance	  literature	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  range	  of	  
factors	  that	  are	  important	  in	  the	  complex	  institutional	  context	  (Lubell,	  2015).	  It	  does	  this	  in	  two	  ways:	  
first	  by	  adopting	  a	  broader	  concept	  of	  misfits,	  that	  includes	  cognitive	  and	  political	  fit	  (Clement	  et	  al.,	  
2016),	  and	  second	  by	  using	  a	  framework	  that	  attends	  to	  gaps	  in	  the	  adaptive	  governance	  literature,	  as	  
discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section.	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2.0	  Conceptual	  framework,	  study	  area,	  and	  diagnosis	  
2.1	  Conceptual	  framework	  
The	  novel	  conceptual	  framework	  underpinning	  this	  study	  (Clement	  et	  al.,	  2016)	  (Fig.	  1)	  derives	  
from	  Young’s	  (2002,	  2008)	  efforts	  to	  diagnose	  international	  institutions.	  It	  is	  specific	  to	  the	  diagnosis	  of	  
biodiversity	  institutions,	  and	  incorporates	  concepts	  from	  adaptive	  governance,	  institutional	  theory,	  and	  
public	  administration.	  Four	  areas	  of	  focus	  are	  included	  in	  the	  framework:	  problems	  and	  players,	  politics,	  
competence,	  and	  capacity.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1.	  Diagram	  of	  conceptual	  framework	  used	  in	  this	  diagnosis	  (Clement	  et	  al.,	  2016)	  
	  
	  
Although	  grounded	  in	  Young’s	  (2002,	  2008)	  diagnostic,	  the	  framework	  departs	  from	  his	  focus	  on	  
international	  agreements	  to	  address	  the	  conditions	  supporting	  biodiversity	  conservation	  at	  multiple	  
scales.	  The	  framework	  addresses	  conflicting	  demands	  for	  organizations	  to	  be	  more	  ‘adaptive’	  while	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recognizing	  the	  administrative	  limits	  of	  key	  actors	  in	  biodiversity	  governance,	  who	  often	  have	  low	  levels	  
of	  discretion	  and	  high	  levels	  of	  responsibility	  (Rijke	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Wyborn	  &	  Dovers,	  2014).	  The	  framework	  
leverages	  the	  potential	  of	  adaptive	  governance	  to	  improve	  institutional	  fit,	  but	  acknowledges	  the	  
practical	  limits	  of	  actors	  operating	  in	  institutional	  environments.	  	  
Insights	  from	  institutional	  theory	  relating	  to	  organizations	  and	  public	  administration	  are	  
important	  enhancements	  on	  adaptive	  governance	  concepts	  used,	  including	  interplay	  (e.g.	  Oberthür	  &	  
Gehring,	  2011)	  and	  organizational	  buffering	  (e.g.	  O'Toole	  &	  Meier,	  2011).	  Rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  
biophysical	  conditions	  alone,	  the	  institutional	  literature	  attends	  to	  a	  diverse	  suite	  of	  causes	  of	  
interactions	  and	  highlights	  how	  external	  pressures	  in	  institutional	  environments	  limit	  effectiveness.	  
Integrating	  these	  concepts	  into	  the	  framework	  addresses	  the	  need	  to	  consider	  how	  adaptive	  
governance	  might,	  in	  an	  ideal	  world,	  achieve	  better	  fit	  by	  grounding	  the	  diagnosis	  in	  the	  practical	  
realities	  of	  institutional	  environments	  and	  the	  competing	  logics	  actors	  in	  this	  environment	  face	  when	  
conserving	  biodiversity	  (Wyborn	  &	  Dovers,	  2014).	  This	  can	  enhance	  understanding	  of	  fit	  and	  point	  to	  
more	  effective	  strategies	  for	  managing	  institutional	  as	  well	  as	  ecological	  interactions	  and	  pressures.	  The	  
framework’s	  dual	  focus	  on	  adaptive	  governance	  and	  more	  ‘traditional’	  institutional	  literature	  leverages	  
the	  potential	  of	  adaptive	  governance	  to	  improve	  capacity	  and	  institutional	  fitness	  for	  conserving	  
biodiversity,	  while	  addressing	  a	  shortcoming	  of	  this	  literature	  by	  acknowledging	  the	  practical	  constraints	  
of	  actors	  operating	  in	  institutionalized	  environments	  	  
This	  provides	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  diagnosis	  of	  fit	  than	  other	  approaches	  to-­‐date	  because	  it	  
ensures	  that	  that	  fundamental	  conditions,	  such	  as	  formal	  authority,	  skills,	  knowledge	  and	  resources	  (i.e.	  
general	  capacity),	  are	  considered	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  more	  reflective,	  dynamic	  practices	  emphasized	  in	  
adaptive	  governance	  (i.e.	  institutional	  adaptive	  capacity).	  For	  example,	  the	  framework	  directs	  attention	  
to	  self-­‐organizing	  (Figure	  1).	  The	  adaptive	  governance	  literature	  stresses	  the	  role	  of	  self-­‐organizing	  
networks	  in	  fostering	  resilience	  by	  preparing	  the	  governance	  system	  for	  unknown	  unknowns	  (Boyd	  and	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Folke	  2011).	  	  The	  institutional	  literature	  also	  highlights	  the	  role	  of	  such	  networks	  in	  providing	  stability,	  
legitimacy,	  and	  resources	  (Powell	  and	  DiMaggio	  1991);	  but	  draws	  more	  attention	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  
the	  institutional	  context	  in	  either	  constraining	  or	  supporting	  self-­‐organizing	  capacity,	  while	  also	  
providing	  guidance	  on	  how	  to	  foster	  self-­‐organizing	  within	  institutional	  constraints	  (Ansell	  2011).	  	  
2.2	  Tasmanian	  Midlands	  and	  the	  institutional	  context	  
The	  Midlands	  is	  a	  rural	  agricultural	  valley	  in	  the	  island	  State	  of	  Tasmania	  south	  of	  mainland	  
Australia	  (Figure	  2).	  Its	  small	  population	  of	  4,709	  is	  distributed	  across	  a	  few	  small	  towns	  and	  relatively	  
large	  agricultural	  holdings,	  with	  an	  average	  holding	  of	  1,750	  hectares,	  about	  four	  times	  the	  State	  
average	  (Gadsby,	  Lockwood,	  Moore,	  &	  Curtis,	  2013).	  Landholders	  play	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  biodiversity	  
governance	  in	  the	  Midlands.	  With	  98	  percent	  of	  the	  landscape	  in	  private	  ownership,	  it	  is	  Tasmania’s	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Figure	  2.	  Location	  of	  Tasmanian	  Midlands	  region	  
	  
As	  Australia’s	  oldest	  continually	  grazed	  landscape,	  the	  Midlands	  were	  emblematic	  of	  the	  
popular	  notion	  that	  the	  country	  was	  ‘riding	  on	  the	  sheep’s	  back’	  until	  a	  steep	  decline	  in	  wool	  prices	  in	  
the	  1980s.	  The	  shift	  away	  from	  a	  reliance	  on	  native	  pastures	  to	  non-­‐native	  improved	  pastures,	  and	  more	  
recently	  to	  intensive	  irrigated	  crops,	  has	  contributed	  to	  declines	  in	  the	  extent	  and	  condition	  of	  native	  
grasslands	  (Kirkpatrick	  &	  Bridle,	  2007).	  The	  trend	  toward	  intensification	  is	  expected	  to	  continue,	  spurred	  
by	  significant	  investment	  in	  a	  71,105-­‐hectare	  irrigation	  scheme,	  the	  Midlands	  Water	  Scheme	  (MWS).	  	  	  
In	  a	  landscape	  of	  degraded,	  fragmented	  biodiversity	  assets,	  any	  increase	  in	  land	  under	  irrigation	  
could	  exacerbate	  decline.	  Although	  other	  flora	  and	  fauna	  are	  listed	  and	  have	  been	  targeted	  by	  
conservation	  programs,	  at	  the	  moment	  native	  grasslands	  are	  a	  political	  and	  financial	  priority	  for	  
conservation,	  especially	  the	  critically	  endangered	  Lowland	  Native	  Grassland	  Ecological	  Community	  listed	  
under	  the	  federal	  Environment	  Protection	  and	  Biodiversity	  Conservation	  Act	  1999	  (Cth)	  (EPBC	  Act)	  
(Australian	  Government,	  2010).	  While	  historically	  important	  for	  producing	  the	  fine	  wool	  for	  which	  
Tasmania	  is	  known,	  the	  grasslands	  have	  been	  under	  increasing	  threat.	  This	  threat	  is	  projected	  to	  
increase,	  with	  over	  40	  percent	  of	  these	  listed	  grasslands	  are	  within	  the	  MWS	  boundaries	  and	  at	  risk	  
without	  appropriate	  mitigation	  (DPIPWE,	  2010).	  The	  Tasmanian	  Government	  has	  committed	  to	  no	  
further	  clearance	  and	  conversion	  of	  EPBC	  listed	  grasslands	  through	  its	  regulation	  of	  the	  Scheme	  
(DPIPWE,	  2011),	  but	  this	  commitment	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  other	  important	  but	  unlisted	  native	  grasslands.	  	  
The	  three	  tiers	  of	  government	  (federal,	  State,	  local)	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  
(NGOs)	  all	  play	  a	  role	  in	  biodiversity	  governance.	  The	  federal	  government’s	  role	  is	  primarily	  through	  the	  
EPBC	  Act	  but	  it	  also	  provides	  funding	  for	  State	  and	  regional	  initiatives.	  At	  the	  State	  level,	  the	  
Department	  of	  Primary	  Industries,	  Parks,	  Water	  and	  Environment	  (DPIPWE)	  is	  responsible	  for	  
implementing	  biodiversity	  policy.	  It	  offers	  programs	  encouraging	  conservation	  on	  private	  land,	  favoring	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conventional	  approaches	  including	  fixed	  term	  and	  perpetual	  covenants,	  and	  management	  agreements	  
(Mendel	  &	  Kirkpatrick,	  2002).	  One	  key	  initiative,	  the	  Protected	  Areas	  on	  Private	  Land	  program,	  has	  been	  
offering	  incentives	  for	  the	  adoption	  of	  voluntary	  conservation	  covenants	  for	  15	  years	  (DPIPWE,	  2013).	  
Primarily	  these	  instruments	  limit	  the	  extent	  and	  timing	  of	  disturbance,	  such	  as	  grazing	  and	  prescribed	  
burning,	  with	  limited	  provision	  of	  financial	  support,	  conservation	  advice	  and	  monitoring	  due	  to	  financial	  
constraints.	  NGOs	  have	  played	  more	  prominent	  roles	  in	  recent	  years,	  becoming	  responsible	  for	  
facilitating	  delivery	  of	  agri-­‐environmental	  programs,	  and	  providing	  advice	  and	  financial	  assistance	  to	  
landholders.	  	  
Initiatives	  in	  the	  Midlands	  follow	  a	  global	  neoliberal	  shift	  towards	  blended	  state-­‐supported	  and	  
community-­‐based	  governance	  approaches	  (Higgins,	  Dibden,	  Potter,	  Moon,	  &	  Cocklin,	  2014).	  For	  
example,	  State	  and	  federal	  governments	  have	  run	  market-­‐oriented	  tender	  processes	  targeting	  under-­‐
reserved	  vegetation	  communities	  listed	  under	  the	  EPBC	  Act	  that	  achieved	  a	  high	  level	  of	  uptake	  due	  to	  
substantial	  compensation	  packages	  but	  are	  thought	  to	  have	  delivered	  limited	  biodiversity	  outcomes	  
(Iftekhar,	  Tisdell,	  &	  Gilfedder,	  2014).	  The	  Midlandscapes	  initiative	  combines	  payment	  for	  ecosystem	  
services	  with	  targeted	  investment	  in	  focal	  biodiversity	  features	  (e.g.,	  lowland	  grasslands,	  grassy	  
woodlands,	  lowland	  alluvial	  systems,	  wedge-­‐tailed	  eagles	  and	  vulnerable	  marsupials)	  to	  achieve	  
landscape-­‐scale	  results.	  Operated	  by	  NGOs,	  and	  funded	  mainly	  through	  philanthropic	  support,	  the	  
initiative	  includes	  the	  Midlands	  Conservation	  Fund	  (MCF),	  a	  perpetual	  fund	  providing	  payments	  to	  
farmers	  who	  enter	  into	  5	  to	  10-­‐year	  stewardship	  agreements.	  The	  program	  is	  informed	  by	  a	  
Conservation	  Action	  Plan	  (CAP),	  jointly	  developed	  by	  NGOs	  with	  the	  support	  of	  DPIPWE,	  and	  its	  success	  
has	  received	  national	  recognition	  (Australian	  Government,	  2012).	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2.3	  Institutional	  diagnosis	  
	  	  
To	  diagnose	  institutional	  fit	  in	  the	  Tasmanian	  Midlands,	  the	  conceptual	  framework	  was	  used	  to	  
design	  a	  set	  of	  interview	  questions	  asked	  of	  49	  respondents	  through	  semi-­‐structured,	  in-­‐depth	  
interviews.	  The	  interviewees	  were	  purposively	  selected	  for	  their	  involvement	  in	  landscape-­‐scale	  
biodiversity	  conservation	  policy	  formulation	  and	  implementation	  in	  the	  case	  study	  region	  (Table	  1).	  
Most	  government	  interviewees	  were	  from	  middle	  management,	  given	  their	  critical	  link	  communicating	  
between	  planning	  and	  operations	  (Ansell,	  2011).	  Landholders	  were	  also	  interviewed	  as	  their	  behavior	  is	  
critical	  to	  conserving	  biodiversity	  in	  this	  landscape.	  An	  initial	  list	  of	  interviewees	  was	  identified	  through	  a	  
key	  informant	  with	  specialist	  knowledge	  of	  biodiversity	  governance	  in	  the	  Tasmanian	  Midlands.	  
Additional	  interviewees	  were	  identified	  through	  snowball	  sampling	  (Atkinson	  &	  Flint,	  2003).	  	  
Table	  1.	  Individuals	  interviewed	  in	  each	  category	  
Category	   Number	  of	  
interviewees	  
Australian	  Government	  (Department	  of	  Environment,	  Parks	  Australia,	  and	  
Department	  of	  Agriculture,	  Fisheries,	  and	  Food)	   11	  
Tasmanian	  Government	  (Department	  of	  Primary	  Industries,	  Parks,	  Water	  
and	  Environment	  (DPIPWE))	   9	  
NGOs1	  (non-­‐government	  organizations)	  involved	  in	  environmental	  and	  
NRM	  (natural	  resource	  management)	  work	  (Bush	  Heritage,	  Tasmanian	  
Land	  Conservancy,	  Greening	  Australia,	  NRM	  North,	  NRM	  South,	  and	  
Landcare	  Tasmania)	   10	  
Landholders2	  and	  their	  representatives	  in	  the	  Tasmanian	  Farmers	  and	  
Graziers	  Association	   7	  
Researchers	  	   5	  
Local	  government	  (Northern	  Midlands	  and	  Southern	  Midlands	  Councils)	   3	  
Irrigation	  interests	  (Tasmanian	  Irrigation,	  a	  consultant,	  and	  Hydro	  
Tasmania)	   4	  
TOTAL	   49	  
1	  While	  NRM	  North	  and	  NRM	  South	  are	  quasi-­‐governmental	  (they	  have	  a	  statutory	  basis	  but	  are	  not	  
government	  agencies),	  all	  interviewees	  in	  this	  group	  have	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘NGO	  interviewees’.	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Interview	  transcripts	  were	  analyzed	  to	  identify	  comments	  relating	  to	  each	  framework	  
component.	  These	  were	  then	  further	  scrutinized	  to	  identify	  strengths	  of	  current	  arrangements,	  and	  
arrangements	  constraining	  achieving	  biodiversity	  objectives,	  particularly	  those	  pointing	  to	  institutional	  
misfits.	  From	  this	  analysis,	  four	  of	  the	  ten	  framework	  components	  were	  identified	  as	  being	  particularly	  
relevant	  to	  biodiversity	  conservation	  in	  this	  highly	  modified	  landscape,	  as	  they	  underpinned	  the	  
problems	  of	  fit	  described	  by	  respondents.	  These	  components	  (framing,	  interplay,	  power	  and	  politics,	  
and	  self-­‐organizing)	  provide	  the	  focus	  for	  the	  diagnosis	  presented	  in	  this	  paper	  (see	  Table	  2).	  	  
Table	  2.	  Summary	  of	  framework	  components	  most	  salient	  to	  this	  case	  study	  
Component	  and	  definition	   Key	  considerations	  for	  institutional	  fit	  
Framing:	  Frames	  order	  actors’	  evaluations	  
and	  perceptions	  by	  selecting	  aspects	  of	  a	  
perceived	  reality	  and	  making	  them	  salient	  
(Entman,	  1993).	  This	  component	  considers	  
how	  biodiversity	  conservation	  is	  defined	  and	  
understood,	  causes	  of	  decline,	  the	  players	  
involved,	  and	  the	  institutional	  solutions	  to	  
address	  it.	  	  
• Framing	  links	  to	  key	  problem	  characteristics,	  sets	  the	  
agenda,	  determines	  who	  is	  involved,	  and	  drives	  
action.	  	  
• It	  reveals	  significant	  attributes	  of	  the	  biodiversity	  
policy	  problem	  in	  context	  that	  are	  critical	  to	  
identifying	  misfits.	  	  
• Problems	  with	  framing	  can	  cause	  dysfunction	  in	  
many	  areas	  of	  a	  governance	  regime.	  
Interplay:	  Interplay	  refers	  to	  cross-­‐level	  and	  
cross-­‐scale	  institutional	  interactions	  (Young,	  
2002).	  This	  diagnosis	  examines	  interplay	  
from	  the	  perspective	  of	  political	  and	  
functional	  dynamics	  and	  the	  interactions	  
between	  different	  institutional	  regimes	  
(Paavola,	  Gouldson,	  &	  Kluvánková-­‐Oravská,	  
2009),	  thus	  dividing	  interplay	  into	  three	  
dimensions:	  functional,	  political	  and	  regime.	  
• Interplay	  links	  biodiversity	  institutions	  to	  other	  types	  
of	  institutions	  and	  to	  the	  political	  and	  ecological	  
arena,	  revealing	  the	  important	  adaptive	  governance	  
characteristic	  of	  buffering.	  	  
• Analysis	  of	  interplay	  can	  help	  address	  conceptual	  
ambiguities	  on	  fit	  (Vatn	  &	  Vedeld,	  2012).	  For	  
example,	  one	  dimension	  of	  interplay	  (regime)	  
addresses	  the	  lack	  of	  emphasis	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  
natural	  resource	  institutions	  relative	  to	  other	  
regimes	  (e.g.	  economics,	  property	  rights).	  
Power	  and	  authority:	  Power	  is	  exercised	  
when	  actors	  pursue	  values,	  interests	  and	  
goals	  (Gordon,	  2009).	  Authority	  bestows	  
formal	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  on	  
individuals	  and	  organizations	  (Hutchcroft,	  
2001).	  Adaptive	  governance	  supports	  
greater	  power	  sharing	  and	  the	  devolution	  of	  
power	  and	  authority	  to	  appropriate	  levels.	  
• Institutions	  codify	  power	  relations,	  empowering	  
certain	  actors	  and	  disempowering	  others,	  which	  can	  
create	  inequalities	  (Moe,	  2005).	  Analyzing	  this	  dual	  
role	  of	  institutions	  can	  reveal	  how	  embedded	  power	  
relations	  affect	  institutional	  fit.	  
• Both	  adaptive	  governance	  and	  landscape-­‐scale	  
conservation	  require	  collaboration.	  Power	  and	  
authority	  shape	  the	  structure	  and	  process	  of	  
collaboration	  by	  deciding	  who	  is	  involved,	  how	  
issues	  are	  framed,	  where	  resources	  are	  directed,	  etc.	  
(Purdy,	  2012).	  
Self-­‐organizing:	  This	  component	  addresses:	  
whether	  actors	  are	  empowered	  to	  act	  at	  
• Self-­‐organizing	  networks	  can	  build	  capacity	  for	  
dealing	  with	  unknowns,	  store	  institutional	  memory,	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Component	  and	  definition	   Key	  considerations	  for	  institutional	  fit	  
appropriate	  scales	  (e.g.	  subsidiarity);	  the	  
presence	  of	  active	  networks	  providing	  
informal	  spaces	  for	  sharing	  and	  making	  
decisions	  based	  on	  knowledge,	  experience,	  
and	  chance	  (shadow	  networks);	  and	  
institutional	  support	  for	  networks.	  	  
fill	  gaps	  in	  formal	  responsibilities,	  and	  provide	  
backup	  capacity	  (Boyd	  &	  Folke,	  2011).	  	  
• Institutional	  conditions	  can	  prevent	  or	  inhibit	  self-­‐
organizing	  by	  networks.	  	  
	  
As	  underlined	  in	  the	  results	  and	  revisited	  in	  the	  discussion,	  these	  four	  areas	  demonstrate	  the	  
value	  of	  thinking	  about	  fit	  in	  a	  broader	  sense	  than	  is	  typical	  in	  the	  adaptive	  governance	  literature.	  For	  
example,	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  need	  to	  enable	  autonomy	  and	  self-­‐organized	  networks,	  whilst	  also	  
providing	  a	  stable	  institutional	  environment	  and	  resources,	  is	  exemplified	  in	  the	  Tasmanian	  Midlands,	  an	  
agricultural	  landscape	  where	  landholders	  self-­‐organize	  with	  each	  other	  and	  government	  to	  participate	  in	  
conservation	  with	  the	  support	  of	  government	  and	  non-­‐government	  organizations.	  
3.0	  Diagnosis	  of	  current	  arrangements	  
The	  diagnosis,	  based	  on	  an	  analysis	  of	  interview	  transcripts,	  revealed	  concerns	  coalescing	  around	  four	  
diagnostic	  components	  (Table	  1):	  (1)	  narrowness	  with	  which	  current	  biodiversity	  conservation	  initiatives	  
and	  policies	  have	  been	  framed;	  (2)	  interplay,	  involving	  a	  dominance	  of	  economic	  and	  agricultural	  
institutions	  resulting	  in	  perceived	  weakening	  of	  biodiversity	  institutions;	  (3)	  power	  to	  effect	  change	  held	  
by	  a	  few	  landholders	  and	  limited	  scope	  of	  formal	  authority;	  and	  (4)	  challenges	  in	  realizing	  the	  potential	  
of	  new	  solutions	  through	  emergent	  self-­‐organizing	  networks.	  	  
3.1	  Framing	  
Analysis	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  interviewees	  framed	  their	  notions	  of	  landscape-­‐scale	  biodiversity	  
conservation	  revealed	  a	  misfit	  between	  institutional	  instruments	  and	  the	  problem	  to	  be	  addressed.	  
Despite	  interest	  from	  State	  and	  federal	  government	  in	  landscape-­‐scale	  approaches,	  interviewees	  were	  
concerned	  that	  most	  programs	  focused	  on	  conserving	  individual	  listed	  species	  or	  patches	  of	  vegetation.	  
A	  landscape-­‐scale	  approach	  that	  explicitly	  considered	  ecosystem	  function	  and	  large-­‐scale	  threatening	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processes	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  more	  fitting	  approach	  for	  a	  fragmented	  bioregion	  like	  the	  Midlands.	  The	  
contrast	  between	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  problem	  and	  the	  narrow	  framing	  by	  legislation	  was	  a	  concern	  for	  
most	  interviewees.	  As	  a	  highly	  modified	  landscape	  where	  landholders	  own	  nearly	  all	  biodiversity	  assets,	  
many	  thought	  conservation	  was	  necessarily	  broader	  than	  the	  legislatively	  framed	  notion	  that	  
emphasizes	  protection	  of	  rare	  species	  and	  ecological	  communities.	  
The	  Midlands	  was	  frequently	  described	  as	  a	  ‘working	  landscape’,	  where	  a	  critical	  consideration	  
was	  how	  to	  make	  biodiversity	  conservation	  a	  viable	  activity	  on	  productive	  farms:	  	  
It	  is	  a	  working	  landscape	  with	  some	  natural	  values.	  So	  it’s	  about	  how	  to	  manage	  the	  biodiversity	  
within	  that	  context	  and	  not	  about	  changing	  the	  context.	  (Tasmanian	  Government	  interviewee)	  	  
	  
Many	  interviewees	  stressed	  that	  biodiversity	  could	  not	  be	  considered	  independently	  of	  its	  socio-­‐
economic	  context	  given	  the	  long	  agricultural	  history	  of	  the	  landscape	  and	  its	  almost	  entirely	  private	  
tenure.	  Perceiving	  Midlands	  as	  a	  working	  agricultural	  landscape	  required	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  a	  
protectionist	  view	  of	  conservation	  towards	  a	  more	  flexible	  landscape-­‐scale	  approach.	  Active	  
management	  and	  disturbance	  were	  seen	  as	  critical,	  and	  actively	  managing	  native	  grassland	  ecosystems	  
for	  biodiversity	  outcomes	  was	  viewed	  as	  important	  regardless	  of	  any	  legislatively	  protected	  status.	  
Many	  interviewees	  also	  expressed	  concerns	  that	  the	  institutional	  view	  of	  biodiversity	  conservation	  as	  a	  
problem	  primarily	  of	  species	  composition	  and	  structure	  was	  too	  narrow,	  particularly	  as	  climate	  change	  
would	  likely	  change	  both	  aspects.	  In	  an	  already	  modified	  landscape,	  maintaining	  ecosystem	  functions	  
and	  addressing	  the	  degraded	  condition	  of	  the	  Midlands	  emerged	  as	  a	  more	  appropriate	  target:	  
The	  question	  for	  me	  has	  changed	  a	  little	  bit	  away	  from	  the	  traditional	  conserve,	  protect,	  
language	  to	  functional	  thresholds…just	  what	  makes	  a	  healthy	  functional	  landscape	  that	  other	  
things	  can	  operate	  in,	  like	  agriculture?	  (NGO	  interviewee)	  
	  
While	  the	  suite	  of	  policy	  instruments	  used	  over	  time	  has	  diversified,	  most	  thought	  this	  could	  be	  
improved	  further	  by	  developing	  solutions	  building	  on	  the	  region’s	  multifunctional,	  ‘working	  landscape’	  
context.	  For	  example,	  although	  the	  State	  had	  successfully	  secured	  many	  restrictive	  covenants	  and	  
prescriptive	  management	  agreements,	  the	  general	  view	  was	  that	  these	  more	  rigid	  legal	  agreements	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were	  of	  limited	  use	  in	  securing	  the	  future	  of	  the	  grasslands.	  These	  prescriptive	  instruments	  not	  only	  
constrain	  property	  rights,	  but	  their	  philosophy	  is	  antithetical	  to	  the	  landholder	  view	  of	  native	  grasslands	  
as	  requiring	  active,	  flexible	  management,	  borne	  from	  decades	  of	  experience.	  Most	  interviewees	  
recognized	  the	  need	  for	  better	  solutions,	  and	  heralded	  the	  MCF	  as	  a	  welcome	  new	  outcomes-­‐oriented	  
approach.	  Amidst	  the	  optimism	  there	  was	  some	  minor	  skepticism,	  however,	  including	  whether	  the	  
financial	  incentives	  available	  through	  the	  MCF	  would	  be	  sufficient	  to	  engage	  landholders,	  and	  whether	  
the	  outcome-­‐based	  agreements	  would	  be	  effective	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  prescriptions.	  
Although	  interviewees	  acknowledged	  that	  landholder	  behavior	  could	  exacerbate	  biodiversity	  
decline,	  they	  emphasized	  the	  positive	  role	  landholders	  could	  play	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  institutions	  
could	  motivate	  them	  to	  participate.	  In	  a	  privately	  owned	  landscape,	  most	  interviewees	  accepted	  that	  
financial	  viability	  was	  a	  pre-­‐condition	  for	  participation,	  with	  several	  repeating	  the	  adage	  ‘you	  can’t	  be	  
green	  if	  you’re	  in	  the	  red’.	  As	  one	  landholder	  commented:	  
We	  recognize	  the	  need	  for	  these	  farms	  to	  be	  businesses	  first	  and	  foremost.	  We	  also	  have	  a	  
strong	  commitment	  to	  handing	  the	  farm	  on	  to	  the	  next	  generation	  if	  they	  so	  desire,	  and	  we’d	  
also	  like	  to	  have	  it	  productive	  and	  in	  a	  better	  environmental	  state.	  Much	  of	  that	  has	  dictated	  our	  
decision-­‐making	  along	  the	  way	  and	  we	  are	  thinking	  constantly	  of	  the	  next	  generation	  in	  how	  we	  
approach	  conservation.	  
	  
Many	  interviewees	  discussed	  the	  need	  for	  institutional	  interventions	  that	  made	  conservation	  a	  more	  
attractive	  prospect	  in	  this	  working	  landscape.	  However,	  many	  also	  lamented	  the	  shift	  away	  from	  
traditional	  industries	  like	  wool,	  seen	  as	  more	  complementary	  with	  biodiversity	  conservation	  than	  
irrigated	  crops,	  and	  expressed	  nervousness	  about	  how	  economic	  and	  land	  use	  pressures	  would	  be	  
managed	  under	  current	  legislation	  and	  in	  the	  broader	  political	  climate.	  	  
3.2	  Interplay	  
Two	  types	  of	  interplay	  dynamics	  dominated:	  1)	  regime	  interplay,	  where	  interactions	  between	  
biodiversity	  conservation	  institutions	  and	  related	  economic	  and	  agricultural	  institutions	  affected	  the	  
efficacy	  of	  the	  former,	  and	  2)	  political	  interplay,	  where	  political	  agendas	  and	  investment	  in	  irrigation	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exerted	  strong	  pressure	  on	  organizations	  managing	  biodiversity.	  A	  continuation	  of	  the	  trend	  toward	  
agricultural	  intensification,	  exacerbated	  by	  development	  of	  the	  MWS	  and	  strong	  pro-­‐development	  
policy	  drivers,	  was	  perceived	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  threats	  to	  the	  future	  of	  the	  grasslands.	  
Most	  interviewees	  considered	  economic	  development	  the	  dominant	  driver	  setting	  Tasmania’s	  political	  
agenda,	  with	  rhetoric	  around	  a	  Tasmanian	  ‘food	  bowl’	  being	  emblematic	  of	  this.	  Although	  some	  
commented	  that	  high	  water	  prices	  and	  poor	  land	  capability	  would	  protect	  the	  Midlands	  from	  ecological	  
disaster,	  there	  was	  skepticism	  that	  biodiversity	  institutions	  had	  sufficient	  strength	  or	  enabled	  sufficient	  
foresight	  to	  buffer	  negative	  and	  cumulative	  impacts	  across	  the	  landscape.	  
When	  discussing	  the	  technical	  challenges	  of	  developing	  a	  long-­‐term	  program	  to	  conserve	  
biodiversity	  in	  the	  strategic	  assessment	  of	  the	  MWS,	  some	  noted	  such	  concerns	  were	  secondary	  to	  
political	  imperatives.	  With	  agriculture	  being	  poised	  as	  the	  ‘economic	  savior’	  of	  Tasmania,	  one	  Tasmanian	  
Government	  manager	  discussed	  the	  challenge	  of	  developing	  strong	  policy	  for	  biodiversity	  conservation	  
in	  the	  face	  of	  an	  agricultural	  imperative:	  	  
The	  bits	  around	  the	  edges	  about	  flexibility,	  trying	  to	  ensure	  longevity	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  these	  farm	  
plans	  would	  look,	  what	  they	  had	  to	  consider,	  were	  just	  that.	  They	  were	  the	  bits	  around	  the	  
edge...	  The	  focus	  of	  the	  process	  was	  it	  being	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end.	  	  
	  
Interviewees	  were	  concerned	  that	  biodiversity	  institutions	  were	  not	  designed	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  
pressures	  of	  politics.	  Policies	  were	  written	  with	  enough	  ‘wiggle	  room’	  to	  allow	  economic	  and	  political	  
institutions	  to	  take	  priority	  and	  were	  not	  backed	  by	  sufficient	  authority.	  Many	  considered	  there	  was	  
insufficient	  political	  will	  for	  serious	  action	  on	  biodiversity	  conservation,	  even	  though	  the	  decline	  is	  likely	  
to	  worsen	  under	  a	  changing	  climate.	  Global	  commodity	  markets	  were	  seen	  as	  even	  more	  daunting,	  
being	  beyond	  local	  control	  but	  a	  highly	  significant	  factor	  on	  landholder	  decision-­‐making	  and	  the	  future	  
of	  biodiversity.	  Although	  the	  language	  of	  sustainability	  runs	  throughout	  policies	  and	  programs,	  how	  the	  
dual	  objectives	  of	  development	  and	  conservation	  would	  be	  achieved	  in	  practice	  is	  not	  explicitly	  
addressed:	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We	  have	  some	  really	  great	  biodiversity	  assets,	  and	  we're	  not	  going	  to	  be	  able	  to	  possibly	  keep	  
them	  all…	  there's	  got	  to	  be	  some	  decisions	  made,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  thing...they're	  not	  made	  
explicitly.	  They	  are	  made	  in	  the	  context	  of,	  you	  put	  one	  institutional	  lens	  across	  one	  area	  as	  
conservation,	  and	  one	  institutional	  lens	  across	  the	  other	  is	  development.	  And	  never	  the	  twain	  
shall	  meet,	  you	  know?	  (NGO	  interviewee)	  	  
	  
A	  perceived	  lack	  of	  alignment	  between	  State	  and	  federal	  approaches	  was	  a	  common	  political	  
interplay	  dynamic	  noted	  by	  government	  interviewees.	  The	  decision	  not	  to	  list	  the	  grasslands	  at	  State	  
level	  was	  used	  to	  illustrate	  this	  lack	  of	  alignment,	  and	  was	  linked	  to	  reflections	  about	  which	  approach	  
worked	  best:	  the	  ‘carrot’	  (e.g.	  financial	  incentives)	  or	  the	  ‘stick’	  (e.g.	  regulation).	  Others	  considered	  trust	  
and	  goodwill	  to	  be	  most	  important:	  	  
I	  personally	  don’t	  think	  regulation	  will	  protect	  the	  grasslands…It’s	  actually	  about	  appropriate	  
management	  that	  implements	  biodiversity	  conservation	  into	  those	  systems.	  With	  trust	  and	  
goodwill,	  working	  with	  the	  landholders.	  (Tasmanian	  Government	  interviewee)	  
	  
Indeed,	  a	  cooperative,	  norms-­‐based	  approach	  was	  widely	  seen	  as	  effective	  in	  dealing	  directly	  and	  
explicitly	  with	  the	  interface	  between	  agriculture,	  biodiversity,	  and	  the	  economy	  in	  this	  landscape.	  
3.3	  Power	  and	  authority	  
In	  the	  Midlands,	  the	  power	  to	  manage	  (or	  not)	  for	  priority	  biodiversity	  attributes	  is	  concentrated	  
in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  few	  landholders.	  Though	  most	  participants	  felt	  all	  grasslands	  were	  important,	  
institutions	  drive	  investment	  in	  only	  a	  subset	  of	  those	  grasslands,	  with	  one	  manager	  estimating	  that	  10-­‐
12	  landholders	  own	  about	  70%	  of	  these	  grasslands.	  While	  these	  landholders	  were	  seen	  as	  being	  highly	  
engaged	  and	  conservation-­‐minded,	  they	  also	  hold	  considerable	  power	  given	  the	  bulk	  of	  this	  asset	  exists	  
on	  their	  properties.	  Even	  though	  governments	  hold	  regulatory	  authority,	  many	  interviewees	  considered	  
that	  in	  practice	  private	  property	  rights	  mean	  decision-­‐making	  power	  over	  what	  happens	  to	  the	  
grasslands	  rests	  with	  these	  landholders.	  One	  Tasmanian	  Government	  interviewee	  noted	  that	  more	  
prescription	  and	  constraints	  were	  unlikely	  to	  be	  successful	  with	  these	  landholders,	  and	  approaches	  
based	  on	  trust	  would	  bring	  more	  success.	  This	  is	  especially	  so	  given	  the	  time	  it	  takes	  to	  build	  trust,	  and	  
evidence	  of	  high	  levels	  of	  trust	  already	  in	  place:	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We’ve	  been	  lucky	  because	  people	  like	  [Tasmanian	  Government	  employee]	  have	  bothered	  to	  try	  
and	  get	  inside	  the	  heads	  of	  farmers.	  They	  have	  sat	  with	  us,	  they’ve	  talked	  to	  us,	  they’ve	  done	  our	  
courses;	  they’ve	  seen	  what	  it’s	  like	  to	  follow	  droughts	  to	  their	  end	  conclusion.	  They	  have	  seen	  
seasons	  come	  and	  go;	  they’ve	  seen	  succession	  within	  families.	  They’ve	  seen	  how	  time	  passes	  in	  
our	  landscape	  and	  I	  think	  that	  has	  enabled	  them	  to	  have	  a	  greater	  understanding	  of	  what	  we	  
have	  to	  juggle.	  (landholder	  interviewee)	  
	  
The	  impact	  of	  trust	  through	  these	  relationships,	  and	  those	  involving	  the	  collaborative	  establishment	  of	  
the	  MCF,	  was	  evident	  across	  interviews	  with	  landholder,	  government,	  and	  NGO	  participants.	  	  
While	  relationships	  with	  these	  key	  landholders	  were	  valued,	  a	  tension	  between	  fairness	  and	  
efficiency	  arises.	  Engaging	  the	  same	  landholders	  time	  and	  again	  makes	  sense	  from	  an	  efficiency	  
perspective	  but	  challenges	  an	  ethic	  of	  fairness:	  	  
If	  you	  want	  to	  achieve	  landscape-­‐scale	  conservation,	  you	  really	  need	  to	  spend	  it,	  I	  believe,	  in	  a	  
few	  localized	  spots.	  	  And	  a	  lot	  of	  money	  to	  a	  few	  people.	  	  And	  socially	  that’s	  not	  something	  we	  
like	  to	  do.	  (Tasmanian	  Government	  interviewee)	  
	  
Some	  interviewees	  noted	  that	  such	  an	  approach	  misses	  opportunities	  to	  engage	  a	  broader	  suite	  of	  
landholders	  who	  could	  contribute	  to	  landscape-­‐scale	  outcomes,	  especially	  to	  connectivity	  and	  future	  
adaptation	  as	  climate	  envelopes	  shift.	  Though	  interviewees	  generally	  considered	  the	  public	  good	  value	  
of	  conservation	  should	  be	  rewarded,	  there	  was	  some	  discomfort	  that	  resources	  are	  mostly	  directed	  to	  a	  
small	  subset	  of	  landholders.	  Concerns	  were	  raised	  about	  the	  level	  at	  which	  landholders	  should	  be	  paid,	  
and	  whether	  it	  is	  payment	  for	  going	  beyond	  duty	  of	  care	  or	  for	  providing	  a	  public	  good.	  There	  was	  also	  a	  
lingering	  discomfort	  with	  offering	  incentives	  and	  providing	  increased	  autonomy	  to	  landholders,	  
particularly	  among	  government	  interviewees	  and	  most	  acutely	  at	  the	  federal	  level.	  	  
Doubts	  about	  whether	  there	  was	  sufficient	  government	  authority	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  major	  
drivers	  of	  biodiversity	  decline	  were	  pervasive.	  One	  Tasmanian	  Government	  interviewee	  noted	  that	  
legislation	  “naively”	  works	  for	  those	  already	  inclined	  to	  “do	  the	  right	  thing”.	  Also,	  in	  a	  region	  where	  
legislatively	  protected	  vegetation	  is	  only	  a	  small	  part	  of	  the	  landscape,	  authority	  to	  intervene	  only	  in	  
those	  patches	  meant	  there	  were	  large	  holes	  in	  the	  regulatory	  safety	  net.	  Under	  MWS,	  for	  example,	  
mitigation	  measures	  apply	  only	  to	  federally	  listed	  grasslands,	  and	  some	  interviewees	  could	  envisage	  a	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future	  where	  only	  these	  pockets	  remain	  and	  ecologically	  important	  but	  unlisted	  vegetation	  are	  lost.	  
Even	  more	  concerning	  for	  some	  was	  the	  lack	  of	  authority	  to	  deal	  with	  routine	  but	  potentially	  high	  
impact	  land	  use	  decisions:	  
If	  you’ve	  got	  sheep	  farming,	  or	  dry	  land	  poppies,	  and	  you	  decide	  to	  go	  into	  intensive	  irrigated	  
orchards,	  you	  don’t	  have	  to	  apply	  to	  anyone	  for	  a	  change	  of	  land	  use…	  you’ve	  got	  this	  weird	  
situation	  where	  you’ve	  got	  Commonwealth	  legislation	  driving	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  planning	  approaches.	  	  
And	  the	  reality	  is:	  it’s	  probably	  irrelevant.	  (Tasmanian	  Government	  interviewee)	  
	  
In	  addition,	  although	  clearing	  listed	  grasslands	  is	  illegal,	  benign	  neglect	  and	  mismanagement	  are	  not,	  
and	  fertilizing	  or	  overgrazing	  could	  convert	  a	  patch	  of	  grassland	  to	  one	  that	  no	  longer	  meets	  legislated	  
criteria.	  	  
3.4	  Self-­‐organizing	  
With	  a	  small	  population	  and	  a	  large	  number	  of	  conservation	  initiatives,	  networks	  have	  developed	  
where	  information	  and	  experiences	  are	  shared	  and	  new	  approaches	  explored.	  These	  include	  the	  
Tasmanian	  Rangelands	  Group,	  a	  small	  group	  of	  landholders	  owning	  properties	  with	  significant	  
biodiversity	  values,	  and	  the	  Midlands	  Coordination	  Group	  of	  organizations	  working	  on	  conservation	  in	  
the	  region.	  Scarce	  resources	  and	  a	  competitive	  funding	  environment	  have	  limited	  the	  ability	  of	  these	  
networks	  to	  implement	  and	  ‘scale	  up’	  new	  institutional	  arrangements	  for	  conserving	  biodiversity,	  as	  has	  
government	  hesitation	  to	  provide	  greater	  autonomy	  and	  power	  to	  these	  groups.	  
The	  Tasmanian	  Rangelands	  Group	  collaborate	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  agreements	  to	  financially	  support	  
biodiversity	  conservation	  as	  part	  of	  their	  enterprises,	  and	  have	  developed	  a	  sophisticated	  business	  case	  
for	  pursuing	  philanthropic	  donations.	  Learning	  from	  approaches	  abroad,	  particularly	  the	  Malpai	  
Borderlands	  Group	  and	  Carrus	  Land	  Systems	  in	  the	  US,	  and	  supported	  by	  NGOs	  and	  individuals	  in	  
government,	  they	  promote	  conservation	  on	  their	  farms	  as	  another	  managed	  element	  of	  a	  ‘working	  
landscape’.	  However,	  their	  temporary	  agreement	  with	  the	  State	  government	  lapsed	  due	  to	  insufficient	  
political	  support,	  and	  institutionalization	  of	  their	  efforts	  has	  failed.	  As	  one	  landholder	  explained:	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We	  have	  yet	  to	  see	  the	  rewards	  that	  truly	  reflect	  the	  cost	  to	  us…	  We	  can	  see	  the	  ownership,	  or	  
influence	  that	  we’ve	  had	  on	  those	  programs…	  	  no	  longer	  do	  those	  conservation	  groups	  feel	  they	  
have	  to	  own	  the	  land	  within	  our	  landscape.	  	  
	  
The	  Midlands	  Coordination	  Group	  was	  formed	  to	  better	  coordinate	  the	  various	  conservation	  
initiatives,	  and	  comprises	  government	  and	  non-­‐government	  agency	  representatives.	  It	  has	  faced	  typical	  
challenges	  of	  formation,	  including	  lack	  of	  resources	  or	  incentives	  from	  their	  organizations	  for	  spending	  
time	  on	  such	  non-­‐core	  activities.	  Competition	  was	  another	  factor,	  with	  members	  often	  vying	  for	  the	  
same	  (primarily	  government)	  funding	  and	  struggling	  to	  define	  their	  role	  and	  niche:	  	  
It’s	  still	  this	  stepping	  over	  each	  other	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  roles	  of	  who	  does	  what	  and	  sticking	  to	  
that.	  Until	  those	  are	  defined	  and	  agreed	  and	  then	  held	  to,	  your	  collaboration’s	  just	  at	  best	  
inefficient,	  if	  not	  it	  becomes	  unhelpful.	  (NGO	  interviewee)	  
	  
The	  competitive	  environment	  has	  meant	  that	  some	  groups	  have	  been	  more	  successful	  than	  others	  in	  
tailoring	  their	  programs	  to	  government	  priorities	  and	  hence	  the	  receipt	  of	  government	  funding.	  	  
A	  tension	  between	  building	  programs	  at	  the	  regional	  level	  and	  aligning	  these	  smaller	  scale	  
agendas	  with	  national	  priorities	  was	  evident.	  NRM	  groups	  experienced	  difficulties	  accessing	  national	  
when	  local	  needs	  diverge	  from	  national	  priorities,	  despite	  being	  responsible	  for	  regional	  delivery	  of	  agri-­‐
environmental	  programs:	  
[The	  government]	  provided	  the	  same	  level	  of	  funding	  to	  regions…	  but	  they	  could	  only	  use	  that	  
money	  to	  address	  national	  priorities,	  which	  caused	  a	  lot	  of	  difficulties	  in	  some	  regions	  where	  there	  
weren’t	  many	  or	  any	  identified	  national	  priorities.	  (Australian	  Government	  interviewee)	  
	  
One	  interviewee	  suggested	  the	  federal	  government’s	  hesitant	  decentralization	  is	  a	  recurring	  problem:	  	  
It’s	  this	  thing	  about	  the	  willingness	  of	  governments	  to	  send	  certain	  functions,	  roles,	  responsibilities	  
at	  arm’s	  length…	  so	  they	  expand	  massively	  and	  then	  they	  contract	  and	  draw	  into	  the	  center.	  	  Then	  
they	  get	  brave	  and	  expand	  again.	  	  And	  it	  makes	  this	  whole	  phenomenon	  of	  cooperative	  
environmental	  federalism	  look	  quite	  vulnerable.	  (researcher	  interviewee)	  
	  
This	  centralized	  agenda	  setting	  by	  the	  federal	  government	  is	  adversely	  affecting	  efforts	  to	  self-­‐organize	  
in	  places	  such	  as	  the	  Midlands.	  The	  actions	  of	  regional	  and	  local	  groups	  are	  heavily	  reliant	  on	  an	  income	  
stream	  from	  government	  that	  is	  divorced	  from	  their	  local	  context.	  As	  self-­‐organizing	  is	  not	  linked	  with	  
national	  priorities,	  funding	  to	  support	  such	  initiatives	  is	  largely	  inaccessible.	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4.0	  Discussion	  
4.1	  Institutional	  misfits	  
The	  diagnosis	  highlights	  four	  areas	  where	  institutions	  are	  not	  fit	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  conserving	  
biodiversity	  in	  this	  highly	  modified	  agricultural	  landscape.	  First,	  institutional	  framing	  is	  out	  of	  step	  with	  
social	  and	  ecological	  understandings	  of	  the	  conservation	  problem	  in	  the	  Midlands.	  Second,	  biodiversity	  
institutions	  are	  failing	  to	  buffer	  key	  economic	  and	  political	  drivers	  of	  decline.	  Third,	  limited	  government	  
authority	  and	  embedded	  power	  relations	  raise	  questions	  about	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  fairness	  of	  current	  
approaches.	  Finally,	  despite	  having	  adaptive	  capacity	  available	  in	  self-­‐organizing	  networks,	  reluctance	  to	  
devolve	  authority	  and	  decision-­‐making	  powers	  to	  these	  networks	  is	  constraining	  institutional	  change.	  
These	  findings	  demonstrate	  the	  value	  of	  considering	  fit	  more	  broadly,	  and	  are	  of	  relevance	  to	  the	  future	  
of	  the	  Midlands	  and	  the	  future	  of	  biodiversity	  conservation	  in	  other	  highly	  modified	  agricultural	  
landscapes	  more	  generally.	  	  
The	  ‘narrow’	  framing	  in	  the	  Midlands	  of	  biodiversity	  conservation	  as	  protection	  of	  rare	  assets	  
(i.e.	  specific	  grassland	  communities)	  largely	  neglects	  ecosystem	  processes,	  even	  though	  such	  processes	  
are	  pivotal	  to	  integrating	  landscape-­‐scale	  efforts	  into	  biodiversity	  policy	  (Bennett	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Despite	  
some	  movement	  in	  practice,	  there	  remains	  a	  need	  to	  provide	  formal	  legislative	  authority	  for	  landscape-­‐
scale	  conservation	  (Clement	  et	  al.,	  2015).	  This	  is	  especially	  the	  case	  for	  highly	  modified	  landscapes,	  
where,	  according	  to	  interviewees,	  the	  false	  dichotomies	  between	  production	  and	  conservation,	  and	  
between	  social	  and	  ecological,	  must	  be	  bridged	  or	  even	  expunged.	  Conserving	  and	  reestablishing	  
ecosystem	  function	  in	  a	  ‘working	  landscape’	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  more	  fitting	  philosophy	  for	  the	  Midlands.	  
Inspiration	  from	  the	  US	  example	  of	  the	  Malpai	  borderlands	  was	  evident,	  especially	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
institutional	  re-­‐framing	  enabled	  landholders	  in	  the	  borderlands	  to	  make	  conservation	  a	  financially	  viable	  
proposition	  on	  their	  properties	  alongside	  agricultural	  production	  (Sayre,	  2005).	  The	  prospect	  of	  
agricultural	  intensification	  reinforced	  views	  that	  the	  future	  of	  biodiversity	  in	  the	  Midlands	  demanded	  a	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more	  sophisticated	  approach	  to	  dealing	  with	  socio-­‐economic	  dimensions	  of	  the	  system,	  which	  is	  
reasonable	  given	  experiences	  in	  other	  landscapes	  (Polasky,	  Nelson,	  Pennington,	  &	  Johnson,	  2011).	  
Issues	  with	  interplay	  were	  clearly	  exposed.	  Conflicts	  between	  the	  institutions	  governing	  
economic	  development,	  agricultural	  production,	  and	  biodiversity	  conservation	  are	  sources	  of	  misfit,	  
with	  overlapping	  institutional	  frameworks	  often	  working	  at	  cross-­‐purposes	  (Brown,	  2003;	  Paavola	  et	  al.,	  
2009).	  Such	  interplay	  is	  known	  to	  stymie	  achievement	  of	  biodiversity	  objectives,	  especially	  in	  
agricultural	  landscapes	  (Henle	  et	  al.,	  2008),	  and	  the	  Midlands	  experience	  mirrors	  the	  global	  challenge	  of	  
harmonizing	  conservation	  with	  food	  production	  through	  agricultural	  intensification	  (Dobrovolski	  et	  al.,	  
2014).	  Conflicting	  commitments	  can	  also	  have	  mutually	  disruptive	  effects	  that	  decrease	  the	  
effectiveness	  of	  institutions	  targeting	  both	  (Oberthür	  &	  Gehring,	  2011).	  Because	  conservation	  and	  
agricultural	  development	  overlap	  in	  their	  geographic	  focus	  but	  have	  divergent	  objectives,	  actors	  in	  the	  
Midlands	  are	  pulled	  in	  different	  directions.	  This	  provides	  room	  for	  individual	  landholders	  and	  
organizational	  actors	  to	  pick	  and	  choose	  between	  the	  obligations	  of	  each	  institution	  and	  disregard	  those	  
that	  are	  inconvenient	  (Gehring,	  2011),	  including	  limiting	  extent	  of	  economic	  development	  due	  to	  
environmental	  commitments.	  As	  such,	  this	  case	  study	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  microcosm	  of	  similar	  interplay	  
dynamics	  at	  the	  international	  scale,	  such	  as	  those	  involving	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  and	  
multilateral	  environmental	  agreements,	  where	  overlap	  between	  these	  institutions	  has	  had	  a	  chilling	  
effect	  on	  the	  development	  of	  effective	  environmental	  agreements	  (Eckersley,	  2004),	  or	  where	  
environmental	  commitments	  have	  restricted	  free	  trade	  (Gehring,	  2011).	  	  
These	  problematic	  interplay	  dynamics	  are	  closely	  related	  to	  and	  influenced	  by	  authority	  and	  
power.	  At	  the	  most	  basic	  level,	  formal	  authority	  for	  conserving	  biodiversity	  was	  perceived	  as	  weak,	  not	  
just	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  institutions,	  but	  also	  due	  to	  the	  narrow	  scope	  of	  legislation	  and	  its	  failure	  to	  deal	  
with	  land	  use	  decisions	  exacerbating	  biodiversity	  decline	  (Clement	  et	  al.,	  2015).	  	  In	  contrast,	  a	  small	  
group	  of	  landholders	  holding	  most	  of	  the	  prioritized	  biodiversity	  values	  were	  considered	  powerful.	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These	  embedded	  asymmetrical	  power	  relations	  are	  in	  part	  historical	  artifacts,	  as	  wealthy	  colonial	  
settlers	  in	  the	  Midlands	  received	  free	  land	  grants	  in	  the	  1800s	  (Boyce,	  2008).	  However,	  the	  narrow	  
framing	  of	  current	  biodiversity	  institutions	  exacerbate	  the	  perceived	  asymmetry,	  given	  comparative	  
benefits	  directed	  to	  this	  smaller	  subset	  of	  landholders,	  and	  disempowering	  others	  who	  miss	  out.	  While	  
engagement	  of	  landholders	  with	  priority	  assets	  is	  positive	  for	  biodiversity,	  perceptions	  of	  asymmetry	  in	  
power	  relations	  can	  hinder	  development	  of	  long-­‐term	  solutions	  to	  interplay	  problems,	  and	  lead	  to	  
further	  separation	  between	  conservation	  and	  economic	  institutions	  (Gehring	  &	  Faude,	  2014).	  The	  
situation	  also	  raises	  questions	  about	  fairness	  and	  the	  capacity	  to	  achieve	  landscape-­‐scale	  outcomes.	  
Fairness	  demands	  smallholders	  be	  given	  opportunities	  to	  participate	  and	  access	  resources	  (Lockwood,	  
Davidson,	  Curtis,	  Stratford,	  &	  Griffith,	  2010).	  Landholders	  privileged	  with	  resources	  and	  experience	  
could	  act	  as	  network	  leaders	  and	  their	  trusting	  relationships	  with	  key	  government	  actors	  could	  facilitate	  
cooperation	  and	  learning	  across	  the	  landscape	  (Graham,	  2014).	  Over	  the	  long	  term,	  a	  more	  diverse	  
array	  of	  stakeholders	  could	  become	  engaged,	  thus	  broadening	  the	  institutional	  framing	  and	  building	  
adaptive	  capacity	  (Chaffin	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  	  
This	  suite	  of	  issues	  related	  to	  narrow	  framing,	  problematic	  interplay,	  and	  asymmetrical	  power	  
relations	  also	  demonstrates	  the	  value	  of	  using	  a	  broader	  conception	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  fit.	  The	  idea	  of	  
buffering	  	  against	  ecological	  drivers	  is	  central	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  adaptive	  governance	  (Boyd	  and	  Folke	  
2011),	  whilst	  the	  idea	  of	  managing	  interplay	  is	  central	  in	  the	  institutional	  literature.	  Bringing	  the	  two	  
schools	  of	  thought	  together	  highlights	  the	  need	  to	  buffer	  problematic	  institutional	  drivers	  as	  well	  as	  
ecological	  ones	  to	  achieve	  better	  fit.	  The	  diagnostic	  also	  showed	  how	  both	  ecological	  and	  institutional	  
rationality	  can	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  calls	  for	  adaptive	  governance.	  While	  inclusivity	  and	  collaboration	  across	  
scales	  are	  central	  concepts	  in	  the	  adaptive	  governance	  literature,	  in	  the	  Midlands	  there	  are	  both	  
ecological	  and	  institutional	  reasons	  to	  focus	  on	  a	  few	  targeted	  landholders	  with	  large	  holdings	  and	  key	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biodiversity	  assets,	  even	  to	  achieve	  landscape-­‐scale	  collaboration.	  These	  are	  complex	  fit	  issues	  revealed	  
through	  applying	  this	  framework	  that	  considers	  both	  ecological	  and	  institutional	  complexity.	  	  
The	  challenge	  of	  institutionalizing	  self-­‐organizing	  efforts	  is	  a	  fourth	  fit	  issue	  identified.	  Specific	  
initiatives	  such	  as	  the	  Tasmanian	  Rangelands	  Group,	  Midlandscapes	  and	  the	  MCF	  have	  provided	  a	  
starting	  point	  for	  such	  efforts	  but	  are	  impeded	  by	  government	  reluctance	  to	  devolve	  authority	  and	  
decision-­‐making	  powers.	  While	  yielding	  to	  local	  demands	  may	  favor	  income-­‐generating	  activities	  that	  
compromise	  biodiversity	  benefits	  at	  larger	  scales	  (Perrings	  &	  Halkos,	  2012),	  a	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity	  
encourages	  devolution	  to	  the	  ‘lowest’	  level	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  act.	  Shifting	  some	  roles	  and	  
responsibilities	  to	  bioregional	  entities	  can	  improve	  alignment	  between	  ecosystem	  and	  jurisdictional	  
boundaries,	  and	  some	  local	  devolution	  can	  ensure	  conditions	  ‘on	  the	  ground’	  are	  taken	  into	  account	  
(Paavola	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  central	  standard-­‐setting	  and	  policy-­‐making	  are	  necessary	  to	  
harmonize	  approaches	  to	  conservation	  across	  landscapes	  and	  ensure	  provision	  of	  biodiversity	  as	  a	  
public	  good	  (Ring,	  2008).	  Striking	  this	  balance	  has	  been	  a	  long-­‐standing	  challenge	  of	  environmental	  
federalism	  in	  Australia	  (Crowley,	  2001).	  A	  challenge	  for	  reforms	  able	  to	  build	  on	  ‘bottom-­‐up’	  self-­‐
organizing	  efforts	  is	  the	  tension	  between	  traditional	  notions	  of	  upward	  accountability	  and	  of	  local	  
responsiveness	  downward	  and	  sideways	  (Moore	  &	  Rockloff,	  2006).	  Although	  Australia’s	  regionalized	  
approach	  to	  NRM	  provides	  a	  governance	  level	  for	  resolving	  these	  tensions,	  there	  has	  been	  resistance	  to	  
providing	  autonomy	  at	  this	  level,	  with	  control	  exercised	  through	  strong	  accountability	  mechanisms	  
(Jennings	  &	  Moore,	  2000).	  Even	  if	  authority	  is	  not	  devolved,	  reforms	  providing	  institutional	  support	  for	  
self-­‐organizing	  networks	  can	  help	  build	  adaptive	  capacity	  by	  providing	  spaces	  for	  testing	  new	  ideas	  and	  
building	  social	  memory,	  ready	  for	  revitalization	  in	  times	  of	  system	  stress	  (Boyd	  and	  Folke,	  2011).	  Looking	  
at	  self-­‐organizing	  activity	  and	  institutional	  support	  for	  such	  activity	  shows	  that	  both	  are	  critical	  for	  
diagnosing	  fit,	  with	  such	  networks	  providing	  only	  limited	  value	  for	  progressing	  new	  solutions	  in	  a	  
constrained	  institutional	  context.	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4.2	  Diagnosing	  fit:	  diagnosing	  conflict	  
The	  diagnosis	  of	  fit	  provided	  above	  sheds	  light	  on	  two	  areas	  of	  conflict	  with	  salience	  beyond	  this	  
study	  region.	  One	  source	  of	  conflict	  arises	  from	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  public	  good	  on	  privately	  owned	  land.	  
The	  other	  is	  adjudicating	  between	  land	  use	  objectives	  in	  these	  multi-­‐functional	  landscapes,	  especially	  
given	  that	  the	  future	  of	  biodiversity	  in	  such	  landscapes	  is	  increasingly	  being	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘novel’	  
or	  ‘hybrid’	  ecosystems	  (Hobbs	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  	  
The	  influence	  of	  property	  rights	  and	  associated	  lack	  of	  clarity	  around	  duty	  of	  care	  were	  evident	  in	  
several	  issues	  of	  fit.	  While	  payment	  for	  provisions	  of	  public	  goods	  like	  biodiversity	  has	  become	  
commonplace,	  determining	  which	  actions	  deserve	  payment	  is	  not	  straightforward.	  Such	  payments	  can	  
‘crowd	  out’	  intrinsic	  motivations,	  and	  even	  restrict	  landholder	  conservation	  behaviors	  to	  those	  eligible	  
for	  payment	  and	  only	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  those	  payments	  (Lockie,	  2013;	  Vatn,	  2010).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  
Midlands,	  landholders	  have	  come	  to	  expect	  financial	  assistance	  for	  conservation	  activities	  that	  they	  may	  
have	  otherwise	  seen	  as	  their	  responsibility.	  Such	  issues	  are	  common	  for	  countries	  like	  Australia	  where	  
the	  use	  of	  neo-­‐liberal	  market-­‐based	  approaches	  to	  solve	  conservation	  problems	  has	  become	  a	  default	  
policy	  option,	  even	  when	  such	  instruments	  may	  not	  fit	  their	  intended	  purpose	  (Higgins	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  
Lockie,	  2013).	  In	  the	  Midlands,	  payment	  for	  conservation	  was	  frequently	  discussed	  as	  a	  panacea	  for	  
resolving	  conflicts	  between	  private	  land	  and	  public	  good,	  yet	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  answer	  to	  which	  actions	  
primarily	  benefit	  the	  public	  good	  and	  should	  be	  compensated,	  and	  which	  are	  better	  left	  to	  alternative	  
options	  such	  as	  regulation	  (Lockie,	  2013),	  or	  part	  of	  a	  basic	  albeit	  poorly	  defined	  duty	  of	  care	  (Earl,	  
Curtis,	  &	  Allan,	  2010).	  Deferring	  to	  compensation	  options	  can	  also	  undermine	  legitimacy,	  suggesting	  
governments	  may	  be	  incapable	  of	  enforcing	  existing	  regulations	  (Lockie,	  2013).	  Many	  interviewees	  did	  
indeed	  think	  this	  was	  the	  case,	  expressing	  concerns	  about	  the	  relative	  weakness	  of	  governments	  
compared	  with	  property	  rights,	  even	  if	  they	  did	  not	  think	  regulation	  should	  be	  the	  dominant	  solution.	  	  
The	  Midlands	  is	  a	  multi-­‐functional	  landscape	  as	  it	  serves	  multiple	  purposes.	  Multifunctionality	  is	  
the	  premise	  behind	  European	  agri-­‐environmental	  initiatives	  that	  support	  landholder	  efforts	  to	  enhance	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ecological	  values,	  while	  also	  fostering	  economic	  sustainability	  and	  local	  social	  capital	  (Lehmann,	  
Schleyer,	  Wätzold,	  &	  Wüstemann,	  2009;	  O’Farrell	  &	  Anderson,	  2010).	  While	  Australia	  has	  failed	  to	  
address	  multifunctionality	  in	  its	  formal	  institutions	  (Dibden,	  Potter,	  &	  Cocklin,	  2009),	  respondents	  in	  this	  
research	  embraced	  the	  concept,	  thus	  revealing	  a	  good	  cognitive	  fit	  between	  their	  framing	  and	  the	  
problem	  of	  conserving	  biodiversity	  in	  this	  landscape.	  This	  finding	  also	  demonstrates	  the	  value	  of	  the	  
conceptual	  framework,	  as	  this	  misfit	  was	  identified	  by	  drawing	  on	  the	  institutional	  literature,	  which	  
emphasizes	  that	  the	  way	  ideas	  are	  framed	  determines	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  an	  issue	  is	  resolved,	  but	  that	  
political	  and	  cognitive	  dimensions	  of	  institutions	  may	  be	  antithetical	  to	  solving	  the	  problem	  (Peters	  
2012).	  
Given	  the	  Midlands	  is	  highly	  modified,	  the	  classical	  approach	  of	  conserving	  intact	  ecosystems	  
and	  restoring	  modified	  ecosystems	  may	  not	  be	  practical	  or	  even	  desirable	  (Hobbs	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  	  While	  
codification	  of	  threatened	  species	  and	  vegetation	  types	  in	  legislation	  is	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  the	  
conservation	  toolbox,	  allowing	  this	  listing	  to	  drive	  non-­‐regulatory	  approaches	  is	  a	  risky	  strategy,	  
particularly	  as	  climate	  envelopes	  shift	  and	  novel	  and	  hybrid	  ecosystems	  become	  a	  real	  prospect	  in	  the	  
near	  future	  (Starzomski,	  2013).	  The	  existence	  of	  important	  but	  unlisted	  lowland	  native	  grasslands	  
suggests	  the	  Midlands	  is	  already	  an	  area	  where	  novel	  ecosystems	  bearing	  little	  resemblance	  to	  historical	  
assemblages	  are	  highly	  possible	  and	  even	  desirable	  given	  the	  intensity	  of	  climate	  and	  land	  use	  as	  drivers	  
of	  change	  (Hobbs	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  The	  focus	  on	  conserving	  species	  and	  communities	  as	  defined	  in	  
regulation	  is	  therefore	  misplaced.	  Using	  the	  EPBC	  definition	  of	  lowland	  native	  grasslands	  is	  likely	  to	  
result	  in	  an	  even	  greater	  institutional	  misfit	  as	  their	  component	  species	  shift	  geographically,	  in	  different	  
directions,	  leading	  to	  very	  different	  vegetation	  communities	  (Harris	  et	  al.,	  2015).	  This	  exacerbates	  the	  
already	  poor	  buffering	  ability	  of	  current	  institutions	  with	  conservation	  approaches	  constrained	  to	  
protecting	  historical	  artifacts,	  rather	  than	  healthy,	  functioning	  ecosystems.	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5.0	  Conclusion	  
	  
This	  paper	  has	  reported	  on	  the	  fitness	  of	  institutions	  in	  the	  Tasmanian	  Midlands	  of	  Australia	  for	  
conserving	  critically	  endangered	  biodiversity	  values	  in	  a	  highly	  modified	  agricultural	  landscape.	  Using	  a	  
novel	  diagnostic	  framework	  drawing	  on	  concepts	  from	  adaptive	  governance,	  institutional	  theory,	  and	  
public	  administration,	  an	  expanded	  notion	  of	  fit	  helps	  demonstrate	  the	  amplifying	  effects	  of	  different	  
institutional	  misfits.	  When	  biodiversity	  worth	  protecting	  is	  defined	  too	  narrowly,	  this	  constrains	  the	  
problems	  that	  can	  be	  addressed,	  the	  solutions	  that	  are	  favored,	  and	  who	  can	  be	  involved	  in	  
conservation.	  Many	  of	  the	  key	  drivers	  of	  biodiversity	  decline	  become	  neglected,	  competing	  demands	  
are	  left	  to	  emerge	  rather	  than	  addressed	  proactively	  and	  coherently,	  and	  the	  flexibility	  to	  deal	  with	  
emergence	  of	  novel	  ecosystems	  is	  undermined.	  	  
The	  diagnosis	  highlighted	  specific	  areas	  where	  institutional	  reform	  can	  address	  areas	  of	  poor	  
institutional	  fit.	  Gaining	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  interactions	  between	  biodiversity	  and	  property	  
rights	  and	  their	  expression	  in	  a	  multifunctional	  landscape	  can	  help	  drive	  reform	  (Berman,	  Quinn,	  &	  
Paavola,	  2012),	  and	  has	  already	  led	  to	  innovative	  collaborative	  institutions	  among	  landholders,	  
scientists,	  and	  governments	  for	  deciding	  which	  landscape	  functions	  should	  be	  prioritized	  and	  protected	  
and	  how	  (e.g.	  de	  Sainte	  Marie,	  2014).	  Collaboration	  sits	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  overcoming	  the	  issues	  associated	  
with	  property	  rights	  and	  the	  multiple	  objectives	  of	  a	  multi-­‐functional	  landscape.	  This	  is	  especially	  the	  
case	  when	  designing	  novel	  ecosystems	  given	  the	  value-­‐laden	  questions	  involved,	  and	  the	  potential	  need	  
to	  shift	  fundamental	  assumptions	  (Hobbs	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  The	  convergence	  of	  social	  and	  ecological	  
challenges	  can	  lead	  to	  productive	  value	  conflicts,	  creating	  the	  right	  conditions	  for	  reform	  (Holland	  &	  
Fleming,	  2003).	  Explicit	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  linkages	  between	  social	  and	  ecological	  dimensions	  
suggests	  Midlands	  actors	  are	  better	  prepared	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  complexity	  of	  biodiversity	  governance	  
than	  those	  that	  seek	  clear	  separations	  between	  these	  dimensions	  (Lockwood	  et	  al.,	  2012).	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Conserving	  biodiversity	  remains	  an	  ongoing	  institutional	  challenge.	  The	  diagnosis	  of	  fit	  
presented	  here	  provides	  insights	  into	  current	  performance	  and	  future	  needs,	  and	  has	  relevance	  beyond	  
this	  study,	  especially	  for	  multifunctional	  landscapes.	  These	  include	  the	  importance	  of	  understanding	  the	  
problems	  of	  narrow	  framing,	  the	  interplay	  between	  regimes,	  embedded	  power	  asymmetries,	  and	  the	  
challenge	  of	  deliberately	  advancing	  self-­‐organizing.	  The	  lens	  of	  multifunctionality	  and	  a	  focus	  on	  
progressing	  towards	  novel	  and	  hybrid	  ecosystems	  provide	  a	  means	  of	  considering	  and	  resolving	  conflicts	  
resulting	  from	  biodiversity	  institutions	  that	  are	  not	  fit	  for	  purpose,	  and	  can	  provide	  guidance	  for	  reform.	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